Where is here?
Analysis of the German deictic hier with co-speech pointing gestures

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Abstract
Two different interpretations of hier [here] with an accompanying pointing gesture exist in modern deixis theory: Klaus Sennholz (1985) proposes that hier with co-speech pointing is an example for the origo-exclusive use of an origo-inclusive deictic expression on the level of the language system. The term “origo” is introduced by Bühler (1982) and is defined as the origin of a coordinate system which is used to organize the personal, temporal, and local structure of utterances. Wolfgang Klein (1978), on the contrary, maintains the interpretation of hier as an origo-inclusive deictic on the level of language use. In his view the co-speech pointing gesture displaces the deictic origo. Neither of these interpretations is satisfactory. In my paper, I will argue for a third possibility: the pointing gesture that accompanies the verbal deictic hier refers to a spatial point within the area the verbal deictic hier refers to. The lexical affiliate remains implicit. This concept allows the consistent analysis of different types of utterances with hier and co-speech pointing. It will be illustrated by various examples from face-to-face interactions that are taken from video recordings of route descriptions at Potsdamer Platz in Berlin.

Key Words: deixis, hier, here, pointing gesture, origo

1. Introduction
How do verbal deictic expressions and accompanying pointing gestures interact?¹ My paper focuses on the complex relationship between the German deictic expression hier [here] and co-speech pointing. The title is an allusion to Wolfgang Klein’s fundamental article on local deixis “Wo ist hier? Präliminarien zu einer Untersuchung der lokalen Deixis” [Where is here? preliminaries for an investigation of local deixis] (1978). In this article, Klein’s interpretation of the German deictic hier with co-speech pointing is in contradiction with the interpretation of the same phenomenon given by Klaus Sennholz (1985) in his theory of German deixis. Tertium non datur, no third possibility is given – so it seems to be. And that is deceiving. In Fricke (2007), I propose a way out of this dilemma. In the following, I will give an outline of my solution. Before analyzing several examples of hier with co-speech pointing, I will describe the database these examples are taken from and will introduce two concepts which are necessary for their consistent analysis: first, the origo-allocating act which distinguishes between primary and secondary origos; second, the differentiation between deixis at non-signs and signs which replace Bühlers distinction between perceptual deixis and imagination-oriented deixis (Bühler, 1982).

2. Data base

¹ See Kita (2003) on pointing.
The examples of the following sections are taken from video recordings of route descriptions at Potsdamer Platz in Berlin. The recordings were made in December 2000, in Berlin. Thirty-three (33) informants, predominantly first year students, participated in the data collection. There were three informant groups. Accompanied by the experiment leader, the members of informant group A each individually followed a certain pre-fixed route to Potsdamer Platz, which started at the Potsdamer Platz underground station and ended at the Sony Center. Each informant was instructed to describe this route as precisely as possible to an unknowing informant from group B, who, in turn, would be able to describe the route to a third person from informant group C, who should then be able to follow the route independently. The sample sentences are elicited in two different situations:

a. Both communication participants are standing at the Infobox-exit of the Potsdamer Platz underground station, the starting point of the route. Certain sections of the route are accessible to the mutual perception of speaker and addressee and can, therefore, be identified via demonstratio ad oculos, or perceptual deixis (Bühler, 1982). Others, however, can only be communicated by means of imagined space, thus, via deixis at phantasma, or imagination-oriented deixis (Bühler, 1982).

b. Both communication participants are sitting at a table in an office room of the Technical University Berlin. In contrast to the first situation, neither of the partners can see any sections of the route. Thus, only imagination-oriented deixis is possible.

3. What is meant by “deixis”?

In contrast to “symbols” or “naming words”, according to Bühler (1982), “deictic words” or “pointing words” are characterized by the fact that they are only interpretable by recourse to an origo, which by default is connected with the speaker. To get an idea of what is meant by his notion of deixis, imagine your arm is performing a pointing gesture. It is as if a straight line is drawn between two points, i.e. the tip of your extended index finger and the point where your body is located, the origo or origin. Depending on who performs the pointing gesture, you or a different person, and depending on where in the room the speaker/performer is, the extension of the straight line would lead to different target points in the room. In linguistic deixis theory since Bühler (1982), similar features are assumed for certain verbal expressions like I, you, here, there, now or then. These verbal expressions called deictics refer to different situational context elements, depending on when, where and by whom they were uttered. Verbal deictics like here and co-speech pointing gestures can only be interpreted in relation to an origo: they are origo-relative expressions.2

4. The origo-allocating act

2 There are two different senses in which we speak about deixis: the Anglo-American tradition considers context dependency as the defining criterion for deixis whereas the German and European tradition, in the line of Bühler, defines deixis as origo dependency and considers deictic expressions as obligatory origo-relative. In Anglo-American deixis theory, deixis is not distinguished from indexicality. In contrast to German and European deixis theory, deictic expressions are indexical expressions, depending on context elements of the utterance situation, which are not obligatory origo-relative. For a detailed discussion of Bühler, Ehlich, Sennholz, Herbermann, representing the German tradition, and Fillmore, Lyons, and Hanks, representing the Anglo-American tradition, see Fricke (2007, pp. 17–53).
In Fricke (2002, 2003, 2007) Bühler’s concept of origo, which provides one single origo for all deictic dimensions, is redefined as a complex entity. A hierarchical structure is suggested, beginning with a primary origo connected to the role of the speaker. In the communication process, the communicators alternately assume the roles of the speaker and the addressee. With the role of the speaker, the primary origo is acquired and, thereby, the possibility to intentionally allocate secondary origos to entities, be these perceptual or imaginary. These entities can be objects, people, and creatures, even the addressee and the speaker, in so far as they are objects of communication that are referred to in speech. Figure 1 illustrates the scheme of the origo-allocating act:

![Diagram of origo-allocating act](image)

Figure 1: The origo-allocating act

On the one hand, we have the communicators in their roles as speakers and addressees. On the other hand, we have the object of communication, those entities that are talked about. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two different things (Fricke, 2002, 2003, 2007):

a. The speaker who, in his role as speaker and as holder of a primary origo, allocates the secondary origos.
b. The speaker who, as an intrinsically arranged entity, instantiates a secondary origo.

For example, if the speaker utters the sentence *the book is here*, in the default case he holds the primary origo (in his role as speaker) and allocates a secondary verbal local origo to his own body in order to refer to a local area which includes his body. If the speaker uses a pointing gesture as in example (1), he holds the primary origo, and allocates a secondary gestural local origo to his own body, to refer to a target entity which does not include his body.

The distinction between primary and secondary origo eliminates the inherent semantic contradictions of verbal deictics that arise when the speaker is assumed to shift his origo to other entities as, for example, in the utterance *the wastepaper basket is on your left side* (see also example (3) below). In this example, the speaker locates the object wastepaper basket in relation to someone in the audience sitting in front of him. The semantic opposition between
the meanings of I and you is determined by the opposition of the semantic features “origo-inclusive” versus “origo-exclusive” (cf. Diewald, 1991, p. 212). I refers to the person who adopts the origo-inclusive role and, therefore, to the speaker himself, since the origo lies with the speaker. You refers to the person who adopts the origo-exclusive role and, thus, to the listener or addressee.

But how can the shifting of the origo to the addressee be explained without giving up the validity of the semantic opposition between the meanings of I and you? The following solution is proposed: we assume the strict validity of the semantic opposition between the meanings of I [+ origo-inclusive] and you [– origo-inclusive] in relation to the primary origo of the personal dimension, which is attained with the speaker-role. Although you has the semantic feature [– origo-inclusive] in relation to the primary origo of the personal dimension, the speaker, as bearer of the primary origo, can allocate a secondary local origo to the intrinsically oriented person of the addressee called you. Thus, although the addressee instantiates a secondary origo, the validity of the semantic opposition “origo-inclusive” versus “origo-exclusive” is maintained on the level of the primary origo. As will be demonstrated below, distinguishing between primary and secondary origos allows coherent analysis of semantic features in local deixis alone also, e.g. concerning the semantic features of hier with co-speech pointing.

5. Deixis at signs and non-signs

The origo-allocating act operates on mental representations which contain the deictic objects, verbal deictic expressions, and pointing gestures referred to. Bühler (1982) distinguishes between perceptual deixis or demonstratio ad oculos and imagination-oriented deixis or deixis am phantasma. Perceptibility is considered a criterion for the classification in demonstratio ad oculos, to be imaginary: a criterion for the classification in deixis am phantasma. Bühler characterizes the first main case of deixis am phantasma as follows:

Here I was – he was there – the brook is there’: the narrator begins thus with indicative gestures, and the stage is ready, the present space is transformed into a stage. We paper-bound people will take a pencil in hand on such occasions and sketch the situation with a few lines. For example, I want to give a visual account of the course of the decisive battle between Caesar and Pompey with deictic clues as Plutarch describes it, and make a line drawing: ‘this is Caesar’s line of battle – here is the tenth legion – here is the cavalry – here he is himself. This is Pompey’s battle line’; and so on. A psychological study of the most elementary imagination-oriented deixis with linguistic resources requires that we proceed from that sort of basis. If there is no surface to draw a sketch on, then an animated speaker can temporarily ’transform’ his own body with two outstretched arms into the pattern of the battle line. [italics added by E.F.] (Bühler, 1990, p. 156)

Considering the last sentence of this quotation, we can observe that the battle line which is embodied by the speaker’s outstretched arms is perceptible and not imaginary. Although perceptibility is the distinguishing criterion for demonstratio ad oculos, this example is classified as deixis am phantasma. What is Bühler’s motivation for this? The answer lies in the alternative interpretation: if classified as demonstratio ad oculos, pointing at a ‘real’ battle line in a battle would not be differentiated from pointing at an embodied battle line in narration. My claim is that the distinction between perceptual deixis and imagination-oriented deixis is based on the more fundamental distinction between deixis at non-sign and signs. Considering Bühlers characterization of imagination-oriented deixis, all examples he gives
have in common that the deictic object the speaker refers to, be it imaginary or not, is interpreted as a sign according to Peirce. The embodied battle line in Bühler’s example is not only a perceivable object but rather a perceivable sign that depicts an absent battle line. It is an iconic sign in the interpretation of Peirce. According to Peirce, signs do not form classes of objects but rather emerge and exist only in the consciousness of an interpreter who produces these relations: “[a] representation is such only so far as it is conceived to be one” (Peirce 1986, p. 64). If we choose the sign function as the distinguishing criterion instead of the criterion of perceptibility, we arrive at the following delimitations:

- ** deixis at non-signs**: the deictic object (demonstratum) is a perceivable entity that speaker and addressee do not interpret to be a sign;
- ** deixis at signs**: the deictic object (demonstratum) is a perceivable or imaginary entity that is interpreted as a sign that represents something else.

In the following, both modes of deixis are illustrated by examples taken from route descriptions of our data base. The distinction between deixis at non-signs and deixis at signs is made explicit via Peircean triadic sign configurations. Peirce characterizes a sign as something (representamen) standing to something (interpretant) for something (object). What it stands for is its object or referent. What it stands to is its interpretant, which is equal to the “meaning” (Nöth, 2000) of a word.\(^3\)

### 5.1. Deixis at non-signs

Deixis at non-signs is the default case of deixis and is characterized by the fact that the entity, the pointing gesture or the verbal deictic refers to, is not interpreted as a sign. This is illustrated by the following example\(^4\):

(1) A: [du kommst hier vorne raus an dieser Straße (.)]
   A: [you will come out here right in front at this street (.)]

![Figure 2: Deixis at signs in example (1)](video still)

![Figure 3: Deixis at signs as Peircean sign configuration](demostratum = intended reference object)

In this example the pointing gesture is directed to a target point which is instantiated by the entity street, which can be seen in the utterance situation. The target object, or demonstratum,

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\(^3\) For more detailed analyses, see Fricke (2007).

\(^4\) The beginning and end of the pointing gesture is marked by square brackets, the stroke is in bold letters, and the post-stroke hold is underlined.
does not stand for something else. It is not interpreted as a sign according to Charles Sanders Peirce but is identical to the reference object intended by the speaker.

5.2. Deixis at signs

If the deictic object (demonstratum) is an entity which is interpreted as standing for something else, we speak of deixis at signs as it is illustrated by the following example:

(2)  A: [das iss die Arkaden/]
     A: [that is the Arkaden/]

The speaker is pointing at the flat hand of the addressee. This flat hand represents, as a whole, a certain building at Potsdamer Platz, namely the Arkaden, a glass covered shopping mall. In contrast to deixis at non-signs, the demonstratum and the intended reference object are not identical but differ: The flat hand the speaker is pointing at is interpreted as a sign for the intended reference object Arkaden. This relation is illustrated by the Peircean configuration of the sign processes on the right: The demonstratum of the pointing gesture is the flat hand of the addressee. It is the object of the first sign. But at the same time it is the sign vehicle, or representamen, in a second sign that stands for the intended reference object Arkaden which is not present in the utterance situation.

6. The meaning of the German deictic hier

Is deixis a phenomenon of language use only? If the answer is yes, then deixis scarcely has to deal with meanings of words and sentences on the level of a language system. In linguistic deixis theory, there have been different points of view (Fricke, 2007). Like Fillmore (1982), we distinguish between the level of the language system and the level of language use:

There are two general ways in which one speaks of deixis in natural language: first, in terms of the manner in which the socio-spatio-temporal anchoring of a communication act motivates the form, or provides material for the interpretation, of the utterance that manifests that act; and second, in terms of the grammatical and lexical systems in the language which serve to signal or reflect such anchoring. That is to say, we can either ask how speakers succeed in using their current situation for anchoring referential acts in space and time, or we can ask
what grammatical or lexical materials a given language has dedicated to such purposes. (Fillmore, 1982, p. 35)

The meaning of *hier* on both levels is illustrated by the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Language system</th>
<th>Language use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>hier</em> [here]</td>
<td>+ space &lt;br&gt; + origo-inclusive &lt;br&gt; ...</td>
<td>+ space &lt;br&gt; + origo-inclusive &lt;br&gt; ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dort</em> [there]</td>
<td>+ space &lt;br&gt; − origo-inclusive &lt;br&gt; ...</td>
<td>+ space &lt;br&gt; − origo-inclusive &lt;br&gt; ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The semantic features of the German deictics *hier* and *dort*

On the level of the language system, the meaning of *hier* can be characterized by the semantic features [+ space] and [+ origo-inclusive]. It is partially opposite to the meaning of *there* which contains the semantic feature [− origo-inclusive]. As mentioned above, the speaker usually uses the deictic *hier* to refer to a local area that includes the secondary local origo, whereas the deictic *dort* is used to refer to an area that excludes it. If the secondary origo is instantiated by an entity different from the actual speaker, we speak of displacement (Bühler 1982). Let us consider a situation in a lecture room. The lecturer is standing face-to-face or “nose-to-nose” to his or her audience and utters: (3) *The wastepaper basket is on the left side.*

If the wastepaper basket is located on the left side of the speaker, then the secondary local origo is instantiated by the body of the speaker. If it is on the speaker’s right side, then this origo is displaced, or transposed to the audience or to someone of the audience. The concept of displacement plays a crucial role in understanding the dilemma of interpreting *hier* with co-speech pointing.

7. **Interpreting hier with co-speech pointing: a dilemma and its solution**

What creates the dilemma in the interpretation of *hier* with co-speech pointing? Klein and Sennholz, for example, would agree on the meaning of *hier* on the level of the language system, but they would disagree on the meaning of *hier* on the level of language use. Why? Let us consider the following example given by Klein (1978) in his article. The underlined expressions are accompanied by pointing gestures.

(4) *Hier steht der Schrank schlecht, er sollte dort in die Ecke* (+ Zeigegesten).  
(Klein, 1978, p. 25)

*Here, the position of the wardrobe is bad, it should be there in the corner* (+ pointing gestures)

What is the problem here? In the default case, the verbal deictic *hier* refers to a local area that includes the secondary local origo, whereas the accompanying pointing gesture refers to an entity that excludes the secondary local origo. How can this contradiction be resolved? Klein,
Sennholz, and Fricke offer three different solutions which will be discussed in the following sections.

7.1. Sennholz’ solution

Klaus Sennholz’ interpretation of *hier* with co-speech pointing leads to the contradiction between the meanings on the level of language system and the level of language use. He presupposes that *hier* is the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture and proposes that *hier* with co-speech pointing is an example for the origo-exclusive use of an origo-inclusive deictic expression on the level of the language system. In his interpretation, the semantic feature [+ origo-inclusive] of *hier* on the level of the language system is substituted by the semantically “stronger” semantic feature [– origo-inclusive] of co-speech pointing on the level of language use. As a consequence, the speaker who uses *hier* with co-speech pointing refers to a local area which does not include the secondary origo, instantiated by the body of the speaker. What are the consequences of his interpretation? First, the meaning of *hier* on the level of the language system contradicts the meaning of *hier* on the level of language use. This fact requires a convincing explanation Sennholz is not able to give: On the level of language use the semantic features of *hier* are similar to that of *dort*. So, why doesn’t the speaker use *dort* instead of *hier*? The following scheme summarizes Sennholz’ position:

![Diagram of Sennholz’ interpretation of *hier* with co-speech pointing](image)

**Figure 6: Sennholz’ interpretation of *hier* with co-speech pointing**

7.2. Klein’s solution

Wolfgang Klein’s (1978) proposal, on the contrary, leads to the contradiction between verbal and gestural secondary origo. Like Sennholz, he presupposes that *hier* is the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture. Unlike Sennholz, he avoids a contradiction in verbal meaning and maintains the interpretation of *hier* as an origo-inclusive deictic expression on the level of language use. In his view, the co-speech pointing gesture displaces the deictic origo with the tip of the index finger.5 According to Klein, the displacement of the secondary local origo explains why the origo of *hier* is not instantiated by the body of the speaker. But

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5 “In den Fällen, die wir bisher betrachtet haben, wird die neue Origo durch sprachliche Mittel eingeführt. Es gibt aber viele Fälle, in denen dies auch durch Gesten möglich ist; [...] So kann jemand mit dem Zeigefinger auf zwei Punkte in einem Zimmer deuten und sagen: (18) *Hier steht der Schrank schlecht, er sollte dort in die Ecke.* Er definiert dann gewissermaßen mit dem Zeigefinger eine neue Origo.” (Klein 1978, p. 25)
this interpretation raises other problems, namely the contradiction between the verbal origo of *hier* and the gestural origo of the accompanying pointing gesture: The origo of the pointing gesture is instantiated by the body of the speaker who is performing the gesture, whereas the displaced origo of its verbal affiliate *hier* is instantiated by an entity which – by definition – is definitely not the speaker. Moreover, if the secondary verbal origo connected with *hier* is displaced to an entity which is not the speaker, how can it explain that, in accordance with the accompanying pointing gesture, the utterance of *dort* in the same sentence requires a secondary verbal origo which *is* instantiated by the body of the speaker. The following scheme illustrates Klein’s interpretation:

![Diagram illustrating Klein's interpretation of hier with co-speech pointing]

Figure 7: Klein’s interpretation of *hier* with co-speech pointing

7.3. Fricke’s solution

Considering Klein’s and Sennholz’ different proposals for interpreting *hier* with co-speech pointing, there seems to be no third possibility of interpretation. For the interpretation of *hier*, either the semantic feature [+ origo-inclusive] on the level of the language system has to be turned to the semantic feature [– origo-inclusive] on the level of language use, or the secondary origo has to be displaced from the body of the speaker to a different entity which is not the speaker. Both proposals lead to inherent contradictions as outlined above. These contradictions can be resolved if we assume that *hier* is not the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture. In their interpretation, Sennholz and Klein take it for granted, first, that pointing gestures belong to certain verbal deictics and, second, that verbal deictic and pointing gesture are semantically co-expressive. In our example, they presuppose that *hier* is the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture. As most linguists so far, they are mainly interested in verbal deixis. Hence the occurrence of gestures in deictic utterances, e.g. if pointing gestures are obligatory or only optional, is mainly used to differentiate verbal deictics from one another. Fillmore (1997), for example, speaks of the gestural use of a verbal deictic. If we change our focus and consider verbal and gestural deixis independently, and do not assume that co-speech pointing requires a semantically co-expressive verbal deictic, then, the following interpretation of Klein’s example is possible:

(5)  *Hier (an dieser Stelle) steht der Schrank schlecht, er sollte dort in die Ecke (+ Zeigegesten).*

*Here (at this place) the position of the wardrobe is bad, it should be there in the corner (+ pointing gestures)*
Within an area the verbal deictic *hier* refers to (represented by the red broken line of the ellipse) and which includes the verbal origo instantiated by the speaker, the accompanying pointing gesture (represented by the black arrow) refers to a place (the green crossed circle) where the wardrobe is located. The gestural origo of the pointing gesture is instantiated by the same entity as the verbal origo, namely the speaker. Consequently, there is no contradiction between verbal and gestural origo. And moreover, there is no difference between the meanings of *hier* on the levels of language system and language use. A potential verbal affiliate paraphrased by *an dieser Stelle* in German and respectively *at this place* in English remains implicit or does not exist at all. The syntactic function of this paraphrase is that of a prepositional attribute. Regardless of whether we assume an implicit verbal affiliate or not, the semantic function of the pointing gesture is analogous to that of an attribute: it semantically specifies the local area the verbal deictic *hier* refers to.

8. Examples

In the following, I will give two examples of *hier* with co-speech pointing which support the solution proposed above. In contrast to Klein’s example, where the prepositional attribute as the verbal affiliate to the co-speech pointing gesture remains implicit, my first example contains an explicit prepositional attribute. It is accompanied by a simple pointing gesture, which means that only deictic information is provided; whereas complex pointing, as in the second example, also comprises iconic information. Both examples can only be analyzed consistently, first, if the assumption of one origo for the verbal and gestural level of language is given up and is replaced by the distinction between primary and secondary origos as proposed above; second, if we adopt the distinction between deixis at signs and non-signs; and third, if we assume that *hier* is not necessarily the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture.

8.1. *hier* with simple pointing

Let us consider the following example with *hier* and accompanying co-speech pointing. The verbal prepositional attribute *an dieser Straße* and the accompanying pointing gesture specify the local area the local deictics *hier* and *vorne* refer to:
(6) A: [du kommst hier **vorne** raus an dieser Straße (.)]
A: [you will come out here right in **front** at this street (.)]

Figure 9: *hier* with simple pointing in example (6) (video still)
Figure 10: *hier* with simple pointing in example (6) (scheme of interpretation)

To be exact, there are two semantic specifications: *vorne*, respectively *in front*, specifies *here*. The prepositional attribute *an dieser Straße*, respectively *at this street*, specifies this specification again. The pointing gesture is directed to a point in space which is instantiated by the deictic object street. The interpretation of this sentence is analogous to the solution I proposed for Klein’s example. Within a local area the verbal deictic *here* refers to and which includes the speaker as the bearer of the origo, the pointing gesture specifies a local entity.

### 8.2. hier with complex pointing

The following example is more complicated. With the concept of primary and secondary origos and the distinction between deixis at signs and non-signs we are now able to analyze *hier* with co-speech pointing consistently:

(7) A: [du du bist ja= **stehst** ja hier so:/ (..)]
A: [you you are just **standing** here like this/ (..)]

Figure 11: *hier* with complex pointing in example (7) (video still)
Figure 12: *hier* with complex pointing in example (7) (scheme of interpretation)
Person A, on the right, assumes the role of the speaker and acquires the primary origo. She allocates a secondary gestural origo to her own body (the blue face) and is pointing at a certain target point on the map of the Potsdamer Platz (the green crossed circle). The pointing gesture contains an iconic component as well, which represents the imaginary addressee, who will later walk the route indicated on the map. The speaker’s hand is not only pointing but is also analogous to the imaginary addressee and her orientation. So where is here? The verbal deictic *hier* means a local area that is origo-inclusive. The utterance of *hier* in our example refers to a local area that includes the secondary verbal origo (the small red face). This origo is instantiated by the speaker’s hand which stands for the imaginary addressee. In other words: the verbal origo is displaced to the speaker’s hand. Consequently, the local area the verbal deictic *hier* refers to is not an area on the map but an area at the “real” Potsdamer Platz that is represented on the map. It is deixis at a sign.

9. Summary and Conclusion

In modern deixis theory, two different interpretations of *hier* [here], with accompanying pointing gesture are offered: Klaus Sennholz (1985) proposes that *hier* with co-speech pointing is an example of origo-exclusive use of an origo-inclusive deictic expression on the level of the language system. Wolfgang Klein (1978), on the contrary, maintains the interpretation of *hier* as an origo-inclusive deictic on the level of language use. In his view, the co-speech pointing gesture displaces the deictic origo. Both interpretations lead to inherent contradictions as I have shown above. In my paper, I have argued for a third possibility: the pointing gesture that accompanies the verbal deictic *hier* refers to a spatial point within the area the verbal deictic *hier* refers to (Fricke 2007). This means that the relationship between gesture and accompanied speech is semantically more complex than we usually assume: first, the verbal deictic *hier* is not the verbal affiliate of the accompanying pointing gesture as conventional linguistic deixis theory claims. Second, the meaning relation between *hier* and the accompanying pointing gesture is syntagmatic and multimodal: in analogy to a verbal prepositional attribute, the pointing gesture semantically specifies the meaning of *hier*.

References


